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1 
BROKEN TAILLIGHT AT SEA: 
THE PEACETIME INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
VISIT, BOARD, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE 
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, USN∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION—NORMS AND REGIMES FOR SHIP BOARDING IN 
PEACETIME 
Globalization and the rapid expansion in international trade over the 
past twenty years were made possible only by growth in international 
maritime shipping.1 International merchant shipping is the lifeblood of 
the global economy, assimilating nations economically and serving as the 
principal catalyst for the political and cultural phenomenon of 
globalization. In recent decades, the world’s marine transportation 
system has grown exponentially, accelerating interstate and 
transcontinental integration. As the number of container cargo ships, 
bulk carriers, and tanker vessels has increased, port facilities on every 
continent have expanded rapidly to accommodate additional maritime 
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 1. See MARC LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD 
SMALLER AND THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER (2006) (proposing that globalization was 
made possible by the advent of the shipping container).  
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traffic. With international merchant shipping now playing a central role 
in joining together nations and continents commercially and politically, 
the system has become more vulnerable to misuse or attack.  
As the world marine transportation system has grown in importance, 
it has become a more attractive vector for militants, terrorists, 
international criminal organizations, and armed groups.2 Parasitic groups 
mask illicit activities throughout the marine cargo chain infrastructure, or 
exploit the system as part of a strategy of asymmetric warfare against 
prosperous and democratic states. Regional ethnic and clan-based pirates, 
extremists, and separatist and freelancing smugglers infect the marine 
transportation system for political, economic, and military purposes. 
Leveraging the anonymity afforded by the vast tyranny of time and 
distance in the oceans, the resulting lawlessness destabilizes nations on 
every continent. 
To counter these threats, maritime law enforcement, coast guards, 
and naval forces conduct constabulary patrols and maritime security 
operations (MSO). States employ warships and law enforcement vessels, 
as well as submarines and aircraft, to patrol the ocean commons, 
particularly throughout the coastal zone.  Ideally, threats can be disrupted 
on the land, before they manifest an immediate danger, or along the sea-
shore interface in port facilities, roadsteads, and inshore waters.  It is 
more practical, and often easier, to respond to threats on land than it is at 
sea, as authorities on land can more quickly coordinate and bring to bear 
against a threat a wider variety of intelligence assets and security forces. 
For this purpose, nations operating port facilities may condition entry of 
port by foreign-flagged vessels on compliance with certain port state 
safety, security, environmental measures, and inspection regimes.  
Searching a large ship at sea is impossible—containers cannot be 
moved about deck and tanks cannot be fully explored unless they are 
emptied. On other occasions, however, it may be prudent or necessary to 
counter threats farther out to sea, such as in the 200-nautical-mile (nm) 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or beyond that limit and on the high 
seas.3   
While MSO include a wide variety of marine constabulary functions, 
naval forces employ doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures for 
vessel interdiction or maritime interception operations (MIO).  The term 
“MIO” itself encompasses a small assortment of naval missions, 
                                            
 2. WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA: A WORLD OF FREEDOM, CHAOS, AND 
CRIME 5-8 (2004). 
 3. A nautical mile is equivalent to one minute of latitude at the equator and is 1,852 
meters or 6,076 feet in length. A statute mile on land is 5,280 feet in length. 
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including naval control and protection of shipping, diversion of vessels 
away from an area or into port, escort or protection of endangered 
vessels, and maintenance of maritime security zones and restricted access 
to sea areas. MIO also includes visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) 
of ships, and associated capture of dangerous persons or seizure of ships 
and cargoes.  
The interception and boarding of a ship during peacetime involves 
the physical act of intercepting a vessel, which may include approaching 
and querying the ship (approach and possibly visit), stopping the vessel, 
sending a boarding team onto the ship (board), conducting an inspection 
or search of the ship and its cargo (search), and potentially apprehending 
persons on board and confiscating the ship or cargo (seizure). Maritime 
interception against suspect vessels may be conducted in consensual, 
permissive, or non-permissive environments, and in a wide variety of 
circumstances. Consequently, legal analysis for MIO and VBSS can 
become complex because it involves addressing two questions of mixed 
fact and law.4  First, the commanding officer of the intercepting ship 
must acquire and maintain situational awareness of the vessel to be 
boarded in relation to the maritime zones and navigational regimes 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).5  
As a general rule, MIO may be conducted by an intercepting vessel 
either in its own territorial sea, or outside the territorial sea—sovereign 
water and airspace—of any other state. Coastal states exercise 
sovereignty over their territorial sea, which normally extends 12 nm from 
the low water mark running along the shore. Although ships of all 
nations are entitled to exercise the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea, this right typically does not include the right to conduct 
VBSS.  Interception of a vessel and executing a VBSS inside the 
territorial sea of a coastal state without its consent typically would be 
regarded as an interference with the sovereignty of a coastal state.  
                                            
 4. The U.S. Navy defines MIO as “efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant 
vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those in 
support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of 
restricted goods.” THE  NAVAL SERVICE, NAVAL DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 1: NAVAL 
WARFARE 37 (2010).  VBSS is defined as follows: “procedures by which U.S. forces 
conduct maritime interception operations in order to determine the true character of 
vessels, cargo, and passengers.”  DEP’T OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVY 
OPERATIONS, NAVY SUPPLEMENT TO THE DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS 2-88 (2010).  
 5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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Although ships enjoying the right of innocent passage may use force 
in self-defense, a coastal state has responsibility for the maintenance of 
maritime security and marine law enforcement inside the territorial sea. 
Assuming that the state conducting a VBSS has authority to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction in the water space of the suspect vessel—that is, 
the boarding is occurring either inside its own territorial sea or beyond 
other nations’ territorial seas—a second and perhaps more complex line 
of inquiry must be addressed: the legal rationale for the boarding. 
Normally vessels are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
state—the nation in which the ship is registered. A warship may always 
exercise enforcement jurisdiction over its own ships as a matter of 
international law. If the vessel to be boarded is a foreign-flagged ship, 
however, there must be some additional basis for a warship to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction over it.  
Exceptions to exclusive flag state jurisdiction exist in times of war or 
armed conflict, such as the belligerent right of visit and search of a vessel 
to determine the enemy character of the ship or its cargo.6 The belligerent 
right of visit and search, which is a product of the law of naval warfare, 
is a separate legal right from peacetime MIO and VBSS.7 Belligerent 
parties to a conflict are entitled to board neutral ships anywhere in the 
oceans outside the territorial sea of a neutral state for the purpose of 
ascertaining the enemy character of the ship or its cargo. This wartime 
right is distinct from the aforementioned peacetime rule, in which the 
warship of one nation normally may not assert jurisdiction or control 
over a ship registered in another state. In time of peace, VBSS may only 
occur against a foreign-flagged ship subject to some other legal rationale 
that serves as an exception to exclusive flag state jurisdiction.  
Generally, the state in which a ship is registered—the flag state—
exercises exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag. 
There are exceptions to this universal rule, however. In contrast to the 
special ship boarding regimes applicable during times of war, the legal 
rationale for boarding foreign-flagged vessels in peacetime are more 
numerous, and in several respects more complicated. While the law of 
naval warfare is a rather discrete body of authority with well-developed 
ship boarding measures, the rules for ship boarding during peacetime 
                                            
 6. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS 
AT SEA 25-29 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).  
 7. For a thorough treatment of the belligerent right of visit and search during time of 
armed conflict, see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture 
in Naval Warfare: Part I, The Traditional Law, 29 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 283 (1991); see 
also Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval 
Warfare: Part II, Developments Since 1945, 30 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 89 (1992).  
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draw on a milieu of sources, and they arise more often. In both war and 
peace, however, only warships or government vessels on non-
commercial service, such as marine law enforcement or coast guard 
ships, may exercise VBSS. The terrorist attacks against the United States 
on September 11, 2001, and the broadened sense of vulnerability to 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has drawn even greater variation 
into the peacetime composite of norms and regimes. The 2001 attacks 
illustrated a shocking breach of security in the aviation transportation 
system, and in doing so also exposed glaring vulnerabilities in the 
maritime domain and worldwide cargo chain.  
This Article focuses on the sources of international law that states 
may invoke as a legal basis for boarding foreign-flagged ships in time of 
peace. In many nations, additional implementing legislation provides a 
domestic basis for the activity in municipal law. Furthermore, states 
conducting VBSS have developed an entire retinue of associated norms, 
regimes, regulations and doctrine that provide additional fidelity to 
custom and state practice. In U.S. waters, for example, boarding U.S. 
vessels for law enforcement purposes is most often conducted by the 
U.S. Coast Guard.  
The Coast Guard uses the term “boarding” to mean an “armed 
intervention aboard a vessel to detect [or] suppress violations of 
applicable law.”8 Once on board a ship, Coast Guard officers may 
conduct inquiries, boat inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests to 
enforce U.S. law. The Coast Guard’s authority may be exercised on 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or against U.S. 
ships on the high seas.9 The U.S. Navy also has extensive doctrine on the 
conduct of VBSS in unilateral, joint, or combined operational 
environments.10 The Navy and Coast Guard are partner armed forces, and 
they often conduct VBSS together, with individual boarding teams 
comprised of U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments 
operating in conjunction with Navy boarding teams, which may include 
trained sailors, special operations forces, or U.S. Marine Corps 
commandos. Much larger organizations, such as the 2,200-person Marine 
Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) or MEU/SOC of the 
                                            
 8. MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.A.2 (U.S. Coast Guard ed., 1983). 
 9. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 2.32, 2.36 (2009) (defining “high seas” and “waters subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States”).  
 10. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NAVY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES 
MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS 3-07.11M (2008) (note: this document has 
restricted distribution and is not publicly available). 
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U.S. Marine Corps, also are prepared to execute a VBSS or MIO 
throughout the peace-war continuum.11 
There are a handful of especially crucial international rules and 
institutions that naval forces, coast guards, and maritime law 
enforcement authorities invoke as legal authority for boarding foreign-
flagged merchant ships.  The July 28, 2010, entry into force of a newly 
negotiated ship boarding regime—the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA)—provides a timely point of departure for 
taking stock of the array of VBSS authorities in international law. There 
exist more legally comprehensive treatments of some aspects of VBSS, 
particularly within the best volume on the topic by Douglas Guilfoyle.12  
The present study, however, is distinct in that it provides both a 
maritime operational context for the architecture of VBSS authorities in 
international law, connecting them to the naval forces that actually 
implement ship boarding operations, and also includes some background 
on United States approaches to development of the law. The original 
1988 SUA treaty was adopted in the wake of the Palestinian terrorist 
attack on the Italian-flagged cruise ship, Achille Lauro. With the deposit 
of its instrument of ratification on April 29, 2010, the Republic of Nauru 
became the twelfth country to ratify the 2005 SUA Protocol. The twelfth 
ratification triggered a ninety-day clock, which ushered the treaty into 
force on July 28, 2010. Bulgaria became the seventeenth state to ratify 
the 2005 Protocol on October 7, 2010.13 
As important as it is, the SUA treaty is only one international legal 
authority for boarding ships at sea, and the entry into force of the 2005 
Protocol gives rise to the need for a broader understanding of the rest of 
the tools in the legal toolkit available to maritime security forces. 
Maritime security forces that seek to board a foreign-flagged merchant 
ship may obtain flag state permission, the consent of the master of the 
vessel, and under certain circumstances, board the ship as an exercise in 
lawful self-defense or pursuant to a U.N. Security Council Resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII. The exercise of port state control measures 
                                            
 11. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS ORDER 3120.9B, 
POLICY FOR MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) (MEU/SOC) 
(2001) (outlining U.S. Marine Corps policy), available at 
http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/POE/POE-301/Documents/MCO%203120.9B.pdf.  
 12. See generally, DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 21-262 (2009). 
 13. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation: Ratification by 
Bulgaria, IMO DOC. SUA.3/Circ.16 (Oct. 12, 2010). 
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may facilitate boarding a ship at the pier, and foreign-flagged ships that 
violate certain coastal state laws may be boarded in the territorial sea or 
contiguous zone.  
A.  Ship Boarding and Sea Power 
Ship boarding has always been an important component of naval 
operations and sea power. For one thousand years, beginning in the 
ancient Greek world, extending through the centuries of the Roman 
Republic and Empire and into the early Middle Ages, naval warfare in 
the West was fought by soldiers embarked on galleys. There was very 
little change in the way galley warfare was conducted in the Greco-
Persian wars in the fifth century B.C. and the Holy League contest 
against the Ottoman fleets in the fifteenth century. Warfare at sea 
essentially was ground combat fought from mobile, floating platforms; 
only with the introduction of mounted firearms did ships begin to fight 
against ships. The revolution in mounted cannons on Western warships, 
combined with the move to all-sail ships, propelled Western navies into 
technological preeminence, and world domination.  
Beginning with the Iberian colonization of the New World and the 
emergence of the maritime states of the United Dutch Provinces and the 
United Kingdom, maritime security was a product of big-gun warships. 
For four centuries, the greatest threats to maritime security lay in the 
naval power of the Ottoman fleets, the impressive display of the Spanish 
armada, the aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the 
pocket battleships and U-boats of the German High Seas Fleet. During 
this period of conventional naval warfare, ship boarding primarily was a 
function of counter-piracy operations and prize law, as well as the 
belligerent right of visit and search in the law of naval warfare. But in the 
past three decades, the growth in insurgency, terrorism, and international 
criminal organizations have emerged from the process of social, political, 
and economic globalization. Piracy has made a comeback. Traditional 
navies have scrambled to adapt to and address these emergent and 
unconventional threats, reinvigorating the doctrine, policy, and 
international law of ship boarding.  
II.  THREATS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
Today the most ominous maritime threats emanate not from enemy 
capital warships, but from the lower end of the threat spectrum. 
Merchant vessels serve as conduits for the movement of illicit and 
dangerous cargo, persons, and weapons. In countering this new threat, 
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capital warships are both more costly and less useful than smaller 
vessels. Instead of development of “breakthrough” weapons such as the 
Dreadnought battleship in 1906, the submarine in 1912, and the aircraft 
carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, today the rule of law serves as an 
effective force multiplier for enhancing maritime security.14 And because 
ships must eventually enter into port, port state authorities, operating in 
nations that may have no navy at all, have become important nodes in 
ensuring the security of the world’s marine transportation system.    
There are an increasing variety of violent, non-state actors operating 
in the oceans. Sub-state criminal and terrorist organizations plying the 
sea have multiplied. In March 1993, for example, Islamic terrorists 
clandestinely smuggled arms, ammunition, and explosives by ship from 
Karachi into the Indian state of Maharashtra, leading to devastating 
attacks. More recently, in December 2008, commandos from the Islamic 
terrorist group Lashkar-e-taiba traveled by sea on a hijacked Indian 
fishing vessel, infiltrating India. Once inside the country, the group went 
on a murderous rampage throughout Mumbai, killing nearly two hundred 
people and bringing the financial center of India to a standstill.  
Across the forty mile wide Palk Strait in South Asia, neighboring Sri 
Lanka has recently ended a three-decades-long war of attrition against 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The small and fast suicide 
boats of the “Sea Tigers,” the maritime wing of the LTTE, were the most 
effective maritime terrorist platform in the world. Over the years, the Sea 
Tigers sank dozens of Sri Lankan ships—claiming a higher tonnage of 
vessels destroyed than any conventional naval force of the contemporary 
era. The group also engaged in numerous vessel hijackings, including the 
seizure of the Irish Moa in 1995, the Princess Wave in 1996, the Athena, 
Misen, Morong Bon, and the MV Cordiality in 1997, and the Princess 
Kash in 1998. The group also hijacked the Malaysian-flagged MV Sik 
Yang in 1999—neither the ship nor the sixty-three crew members were 
ever heard from again. In February 2008, the Sea Tigers sank a Sri 
Lankan fast attack craft in the sea of Thalaimannar, almost 200 nm from 
Colombo. Before the defeat of the LTTE, the Sea Tigers were 
extraordinarily successful, sinking over 30 percent of the small boats in 
the Sri Lankan navy. Although the LTTE eventually was defeated on 
land, the Sea Tigers were never beaten at sea, and their success 
represents the specter of a new face of maritime terrorism.  
In the intervening decades since the LTTE began its campaign, other 
prominent maritime terrorist attacks have occurred throughout the world, 
                                            
 14. Commander James Kraska, Grasping “The Influence of Law on Sea Power,” 62 
NAVAL WAR C. REV. 113, 121-22 (2009). 
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including the bombing of Lord Mountbatten’s private yacht in 1979 by 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army. In 2000, Al-Qaeda attacked the 
USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden, Yemen. The slow, low-tech suicide assault 
on the USS Cole killed seventeen sailors and nearly sank the powerful 
warship. The attack on the French oil tanker Limburg, also by Al-Qaeda, 
occurred off the coast of Yemen in October 2002, and exposed the 
vulnerability of energy sea lines of communication between the Strait of 
Hormuz and thirsty markets in Europe and Asia. The deadly bombing of 
Super Ferry 14 in 2004 by the Abu Sayyaf organization in the 
Philippines killed 116 people—the world’s greatest maritime terrorist 
attack. Two years later, in 2006, a Chinese-made C-802 cruise missile 
launched by Hezbollah struck the Sa’ar 5-class Israeli Navy corvette, 
INS Hanit, heavily damaging the ship and killing four crew members. 
Even more recently, on July 28, 2010, the Japanese oil tanker M Star was 
damaged by an attack while traveling from Qatar to Japan.15 The 
mysterious explosion appears to have been detonated by Abdullah 
Azzam Brigades, an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group.16   
Even more creative maritime dangers may be on the horizon. In the 
Gulf of Guinea, for example, guerillas from the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta utilize small boat swarms to disrupt 
offshore oil infrastructure. There is a renaissance underway in the 
development of unmanned aerial systems in conventional armed forces. 
As the technology becomes ubiquitous, it could be misappropriated by 
insurgent groups and misused for developing water-borne improvised 
explosive devices. Commercial, off-the-shelf unmanned underwater 
vehicles that are used for oceanography may be converted into torpedoes 
or marine mines. Finally, social media and cell phones now may be used 
to network agitating “flash mobs” embarked on swarms of shallow water 
vessels that could converge at sea to endanger merchant shipping or 
block the mobility of warships. Nations have responded to these lower-
order and evolving maritime threats, not by destroying ships, but by 
boarding them. In doing so, states invoke a range of legal and policy 
rationales for inspecting or searching a ship and seizing the vessel, or its 
crew, passengers, or cargo. 
                                            
 15. Mystery of Japanese Tanker Damage Probed, BBC NEWS, July 29, 2010, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10803239.   
 16. Japanese Tanker was Damaged in Terror Attack, UAE Says, BBC NEWS, Aug. 6, 
2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10890098.  
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III.  THE NORMS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA—FLAG STATES, PORT STATES, 
AND COASTAL STATES 
Contemporary international law of the sea has developed over the 
past four centuries of the modern world, yet some of the norms reflected 
in oceans law date to antiquity. The norm of freedom of the seas, for 
example, was championed by Ancient Phoenicia, and was a feature of 
the law and policy of Ancient Greece and Rome. Norms governing 
conduct at sea developed across historical periods during peace and war. 
International maritime incidents, and state responses thereto, are norm-
indicators and norm-generators.17 A norm exists in a given social setting 
to the extent that states or individuals usually act in a certain way and 
face consequences when they do not act in this way.18 Realists would 
suggest that norms are upheld through rationalist pursuit of self-interest 
or national interest, but norms also inevitably reflect a sense of justice 
and morality. Although there is a deontological element to norms, it does 
not mean that sea power and politics are irrelevant.19 Perhaps the 
strongest and most long-standing norm in oceans governance is exclusive 
flag state jurisdiction.   
A.  Flag State Authority and Master’s Consent 
With more than 155 state parties, UNCLOS is the “constitution” for 
the world’s oceans.  The treaty reflects customary international law 
concerning operations at sea, providing a framework for peacetime 
maritime security operations. As a general principle, vessels in 
international waters are immune from the jurisdiction of any nation other 
than the flag state. This concept of exclusive flag state jurisdiction is the 
bedrock of authority governing VBSS, and necessarily serves as the 
point of departure for any study on ship boarding.  
Vessels on the high seas are subject to the norm of exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction, unless there is an exception or intervening rule. This 
means that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security and 
law enforcement on ships in international waters falls on the flag state. 
States may provide permission or consent to outsource their 
                                            
 17. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the 
Study of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN 
WORLD POLITICS 3-7 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988). 
 18. Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
1095, 1097 (1986). 
 19. Gary Goertz & Paul F. Diehl, Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some 
Conceptual and Measurement Issues, 36 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 634, 639 (1992). 
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responsibility, which may include negotiation of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with other nations, but the flag state possesses authority as a 
matter of sovereignty. Commanders operating at sea may seek consent to 
board a vessel from the flag state on an ad hoc basis as well, either by 
requesting approval from the national-level authorities of the flag state, 
or by seeking the consent of the master of the vessel. Coordinating VBSS 
of a flag state’s merchant ships is an exercise, rather than a diminution, 
of flag state sovereignty. Permission to board may be narrowly 
circumscribed, however, and does not necessarily entail consent to 
inspect, search or seize the vessel. Flag states cooperate to leverage the 
capabilities of other states to enforce international standards of safety and 
security. Nowhere is collaboration so ingrained than in counter-drug 
operations at sea.   
1.  Counter-Drug Cooperation 
Cocaine is the second most common illegal drug entering the United 
States. The illicit cocaine market funnels vast sums of cash to criminal 
gangs throughout the Americas, including Mexican drug cartels and the 
terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia. 
Illegal drugs travel by sea from the Andean Ridge to isolated beaches 
along the coasts of Mexico, where the contraband is loaded onto trucks 
and driven across the Southwest border.  
Treaties to suppress international drug trafficking constitute some of 
the most mature maritime treaties designed to promote maritime security 
cooperation.  For example, 17(3)-(4) and (7)-(11) of the 1988 U.N. 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (“Vienna Convention”), urges states to cooperate and provide 
consent in the boarding of their ships engaged in international drug 
trafficking.20 Article 108 of UNCLOS reflects the duty of all states to 
cooperate in the suppression of illicit drug trafficking by ships on the 
high seas. These rules apply through extension of Article 58(2) to the 
EEZ. The member states of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) have developed concrete regimes that reflect the norms to 
suppress maritime drug trafficking through 1990 amendments to the 
1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic 
                                            
 20. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances art. 17, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 493; see 
Eur. Consult. Ass., Agreement by Illicit Traffic by Sea, Implementing Article 17 of the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Pyschotropic 
Substances, Doc. No. 156 (1995). 
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(FAL).21 The guidance and industry practices adopted by FAL are aimed 
at enhancing port state security. More recently, the IMO Assembly 
adopted guidelines for the suppression of illicit drug trafficking.22  
Shiprider agreements, which may be either bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements, permit marine law enforcement forces of one state to 
embark in the patrol vessel of another state. Shiprider agreements may be 
used in a variety of contexts, including fisheries enforcement, marine 
environmental protection, countering illegal migration and human 
smuggling, and disrupting international drug trafficking. The agreements 
serve as a force multiplier and create a synergistic link among flag, port, 
coastal states, and interdicting states. A law enforcement official riding 
on a foreign warship may quickly authorize a foreign boarding party to 
inspect a suspicious vessel flying the same flag as the shiprider. The 
shiprider agreement between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago, 
for example, even allows U.S. law to be enforced against a ship engaged 
in drug trafficking that is registered in Trinidad and Tobago.23  
The United States has twenty-seven such agreements, which link the 
counter-drug efforts of the nation to Caribbean and Latin American 
states, as well as the United Kingdom. The agreement between the 
United States and the United Kingdom provides a non-reciprocal right of 
ship boarding,24 whereas the agreement between Spain and Italy grants 
standing authority for each to conduct visit and search of the other’s 
vessels.25 Typically, bilateral agreements establish a streamlined 
procedure for a nation seeking to board the vessel of another state to 
obtain consent from the flag state on a case-by-case basis. Likewise, 
states may negotiate multilateral shiprider agreements, such as the 2003 
Caribbean Regional Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing 
                                            
 21. See, e.g., IMO, Prevention of Drug Smuggling on Ships Engaged in International 
Traffic: Interim Guidelines for Use by Shipowners, Seafarers and Others Closely 
Involved with the Operation of Ships, IMO DOC. FAL.5/Circ.1 (Feb. 5, 1997); see also, 
IMO, Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse: Guidelines for Shipowners and Masters on 
Prevention, Detection and Recognition, IMO DOC. FAL.5/Circ.9 (Jan. 25, 1996).   
 22. IMO, Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs, 
Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International 
Maritime Traffic, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 872 (20) (Nov. 27, 1997). The Guidelines 
attached to the resolution replaced the interim Guidelines adopted in IMO FAL.5/Circ. 
1/Rev.1 (Feb. 5, 1997). 
 23. Agreement Concerning Maritime Counter-Drug Operation, ¶ 6, Mar. 4, 1996, 
T.I.A.S. 12732. 
 24. Agreement Concerning Narcotic Drugs: Interdiction of Vessels, U.S.-U.K., ¶ 1, 
Nov. 13, 1981, T.I.A.S. 10296. 
 25. Treaty Between the Kingdom of Spain and the Italian Republic to Combat Illicit 
Drug Trafficking at Sea, Spain-It., art. 5, Mar. 23, 1990, 1776 U.N.T.S. 242. 
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Illicity Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances in the Caribbean Area.26 
2.  Proliferation Security Initiative 
One million tons of cocaine flow into the United States every year, 
and the astonishing quantity of illegal drugs opens the door to the 
prospect of smuggling even more malicious cargo—including WMDs—
into the United States. Perhaps the most pernicious threat from the sea is 
the surreptitious introduction of terrorists or WMDs via the international 
marine transportation system. The reality of this threat was exposed by 
the transit of a small, shadowy North Korean freighter, the MV So San.  
In October 2002, less than one year after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, Spanish commandos conducted a fast-rope rappel 
onto the decks of the freighter MV So San, which was underway in the 
Indian Ocean. The saga of the MV So San began when North Korea 
secretly loaded the vessel with Scud missiles, missile fuel, high explosive 
warheads, and other missile components; the ship set sail from Asia 
bound for the Middle East. Operating on British and American 
intelligence, the Spanish frigates Patino and Navarra approached and 
queried the ship. Steaming 600 miles off the Horn of Africa, So San 
provided inconsistent responses to warship queries, and ultimately the 
vessel claimed Cambodian registry, something Phnom Penh was unable 
to verify. Consequently, the government of Cambodia granted 
conditional consent for forces to board the vessel, assuming the ship was 
in fact registered in Cambodia.  
Once on board the ship, the marines discovered the Scud missiles 
and associated components hidden under a cargo of dry cement. For 
several days, American, Spanish, and British authorities were uncertain 
of the destination of the cargo, until the government of Yemen stepped 
forward to claim the missiles.27 During the So San crisis, I served as a 
legal adviser on a major Pentagon staff, which searched in vain for a 
legal justification that would permit the nations involved to detain the 
illicit cargo. Upon assurances from officials in the Yemeni capital of 
Sana’a that the missiles would be properly secured and not transferred to 
a third country, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States 
                                            
 26. J. Ashley Roach, Initiatives to Enhance Maritime Security, 28 MARINE POL’Y 41, 
64 (2004) (describing ship boarding provisions). 
 27. Use of Force and Arms Control, 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, at 1052-57, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/139638.pdf.  
14 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
released the cargo. There was no lawful basis to detain the ship or 
confiscate its cargo, but the incident generated a great deal of interest 
inside the White House to develop a more effective international dragnet 
to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.  The effect of the incident 
throughout the U.S. maritime security policy community was palpable; 
immediately work began tightening the rules of nonproliferation and 
counterterrorism.  
Just seven months after the So San incident, President George W. 
Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Standing in 
solidarity with eleven core partner nations meeting in Krakow, Poland, 
the United States proclaimed the first comprehensive effort to take stock 
of the range of instruments and authorities to promote global, 
cooperative action against the spread of WMDs.28 PSI is an activity, not 
an organization or institution, and the only requirement to participate is 
acceptance and ability to adhere to the Interdiction Principles for the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, which were subsequently reached in 
September 2003.29  
Maritime interdiction is a key component of PSI, which promotes a 
cooperative network for maritime interdiction of vessels reasonably 
suspected of transporting cargoes of WMDs, their delivery systems, or 
related materials. PSI seeks to establish a more dynamic, creative, and 
proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or from states and non-
state actors. Many officials in the U.S. government described PSI to 
Sharon Squassoni of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) this 
way: PSI relies on the “broken taillight scenario,” whereby officials from 
a range of cooperating states look for “all available options to stop a ship 
suspected of transporting WMD[s].”30 But no legal corners are cut. One 
of the early participants in PSI emphasizes that it is grounded in 
compliance with national and international law and frameworks, 
including respect for exclusive flag state jurisdiction.31 Participation in 
PSI represents political will for nations to “seriously consider providing 
consent under appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching 
                                            
 28. See Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (last 
updated Sept. 10, 2010), www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm. 
 29. The Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (last updated Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm.  
 30. SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21881, PROLIFERATION 
SECURITY INITIATIVE 4 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ 
RS21881.pdf. 
 31. J. Ashley Roach, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Countering Proliferation 
by Sea, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND CHINA 351, 353 (Myron 
H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & Kuen-chen Fu, eds., 2006). 
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of its own flag vessels by other States and to the seizure of such WMD-
related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such States.”32  
Only months after the initiative was launched, British and American 
intelligence communities discovered that the German-registered vessel, 
BBC China, was transporting uranium enrichment equipment from 
Malaysia to Libya, via Dubai. With the consent of Germany, the vessel 
was diverted to the Italian port of Taranto, and Italian authorities 
searched the vessel and seized the centrifuge materials, which were not 
listed on the cargo manifest.  Two months later, Libya announced that it 
was abandoning its ambition to develop a uranium enrichment 
capability.33 The BBC China interdiction has been followed by additional 
PSI successes that, for political reasons, have not been widely 
publicized.34 These successful efforts include disrupting Iranian attempts 
to procure goods for its nuclear program, and preventing a country in 
another region of the world from receiving equipment for a ballistic 
missile program.35 
PSI is now supported by more than ninety nations, and has been 
endorsed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).36 In 1994, 
NATO expressed strong support for counter-proliferation efforts.37 A 
July 20, 2007 proposal by the NATO Senior Defence Group on 
Proliferation subsequently was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council 
on September 26, 2007.  NATO support for PSI was reaffirmed.38 The 
initiative also was endorsed by the countries of the G8 and the former 
U.N. Secretary-General.39  
                                            
 32. CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3520.02A, PROLIFERATION 
SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) ACTIVITY PROGRAM (2007). 
 33. Robin Wright, Ship Incident May Have Swayed Libya, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2004 
at A18.  
 34. Robert Joseph, Remarks at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in 
Singapore 5 (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.nti.orgle_research/official_docs/ 
dos/dos081505.pdf. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, supra note 28. 
 37. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Alliance Policy Framework on 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council, June 9-10, 1994, NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(94)45 (June 9, 1994), 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940609a.htm.  
 38. Press Release, NATO, Istanbul Summit Communiqué (June 28, 2004), available 
at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm. 
 39. Pierre Claude Nolin, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation, at  5, NATO Doc. 168 STC 04 E Rev. 1 (Nov. 2004); U.N. Secretary-
General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 1, 2004).  
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Eleven states have signed PSI ship boarding agreements with the 
United States.40 As a member of the U.S. delegation for negotiations for 
several of these treaties, I would suggest that it is important to 
understand that the agreements typically do not constitute blanket 
authority for one state to automatically board the ships of a partner 
nation. Although there are four primary models among the nine 
agreements, in general the treaties establish a mechanism for flag state 
expedited review of a request by one party to board a ship registered by 
the other party. The agreements may contain a provision for presumed 
consent if a request to board a ship of one party, however, is not denied 
by the flag state within a few hours.  
3.  Master’s Consent 
Both the counterdrug shiprider agreements and the PSI ship boarding 
agreements serve as proxies for or to facilitate flag state consent of a 
request to board a suspicious vessel. The United States also accepts that 
the master of a vessel can provide authorization for boarding his ship. 
Authority for boarding based solely on the basis of the master’s consent 
is derived from the master’s plenary authority over the ship, and reflects 
the custom and state practice of flag states and their masters. Masters are 
endowed with plenary authority over their ship while it is in international 
waters, and may allow anyone to come on board the vessel as his guest, 
including foreign law enforcement officials and military forces. Such 
invited vessel boardings, if not coerced by the warship, are consensual in 
nature. There is no codified rule of international law expressly 
authorizing the master of a vessel to grant consent to board his vessel, 
but longstanding maritime custom supports the practice. The United 
States and Coalition partners used permission from vessel masters to 
conduct boardings of foreign-flagged merchant ships throughout the 
Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. 
Some nations do not recognize a master’s authority to assent to a 
consensual boarding. The voluntary consent of the master permits the 
boarding, but it does not allow the assertion of law enforcement 
authority. A consensual boarding is not, therefore, an exercise of 
maritime law enforcement jurisdiction per se. The scope and duration of 
                                            
 40. See Ship Boarding Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 29, 2010, 8:59 PM), 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm (listing countries participating in ship boarding 
agreements; the author participated in negotiating the agreements with Bahamas and 
Malta). 
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a consensual boarding may be subject to conditions imposed by the 
master and may be terminated by the master at his discretion. 
Nevertheless, such boardings have utility in allowing rapid verification 
of the legitimacy of a vessel’s voyage by obtaining or confirming vessel 
documents, cargo, and navigation records without undue delay to the 
boarded vessel. In cases where the vessel’s flag state is a party to a 
bilateral/multilateral agreement, including a ship boarding provision, and 
there exist reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is engaged in the 
illicit activity that is the subject of the agreement, boarding shall be 
conducted under the terms of that agreement vice seeking the master’s 
consent.   
4.  Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 
Under the “Straddling Stocks” or “Fish Stocks” Agreement, states 
may, in certain circumstances, board foreign-flagged vessels in order to 
prevent over-fishing.41 Furthermore, parties that are also members of 
sub-regional fisheries agreements or Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations may board foreign-flagged vessels and enforce sub-
regional or regional agreements even if the vessel is registered in a state 
that is not a party to such agreement, so long as the ship is registered in a 
state that is party to the overall Fish Stocks Agreement.42 During 
fisheries enforcement interdictions, the boarding party should “avoid the 
use of force except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety 
of the inspectors” or in situations involving opposed boarding, in which 
“the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of their duties.”43 In all 
cases the use of force must be reasonable under the circumstances. 
Beyond this exception, however, the flag state exercises general 
exclusive flag state jurisdiction over fishing vessels flying its flag, 
subject to the rights of the coastal state to enforce its EEZ.44   
B.  Port State Control Measures 
Often enforcement and compliance with international shipping 
regulations is most effectively accomplished in port, with collaboration 
                                            
 41. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 20, 
opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3, 34 I.L.M. 1542. 
 42. Id. art. 21. 
 43. Id. art. 22(1)(f).  
 44. Id. art. 19. 
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of all interested parties, and with the flag state in a central role. In 
addition to flag state consent under Articles 92 and 94 and port state 
control measures under Article 25 of UNCLOS,45 there are ample 
authorities for boarding vessels either at sea or at the pier. All States 
exercise sovereignty within their ports, roadsteads, and inland waters and 
may enforce national laws over foreign commercial ships in those areas.  
Under international law, a coastal state may impose conditions on ships 
entering its ports or internal waters, including requirements for vessel 
prior boarding and inspection before entering port. A “port” consists of 
the permanent harborworks that are an integral part of the harbor system 
forming part of the coast.46  In the United States, the Coast Guard uses 
extensive port state control measures of the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 as an important element of maritime 
homeland security, as well as for enforcement of U.S. environmental 
laws.47 A roadstead is a port extension facility used in loading, 
unloading, and anchoring of ships within the territorial sea.48 Such 
provisions should be applied on a non-discriminatory basis.  
Any ship, including a warship, may be denied entry into port by a 
port state for virtually any reason, although there is an exception for 
force majeure. Boarding and inspection may occur at any time, even 
prior to port entry such as when the vessel is in territorial seas, the EEZ, 
or even on the high seas.  Foreign warships and other ships entitled to 
sovereign immunity must comply with the laws and regulations of the 
coastal state, but may not be boarded or inspected.  
C.  Coastal State Authority 
The sovereignty of a coastal state extends beyond its land territory 
and internal waters “to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial 
sea.”49  Generally, the ships of all nations are entitled to conduct 
“innocent passage” in the territorial sea, waters extending seaward from 
the shoreline to 12 nm, of a coastal state. International law allows coastal 
states to adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through 
                                            
 45. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 25, 92, 94. 
 46. Id. art. 11.  
 47. See, e.g., Maritime Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 104, 116 
Stat. 2064, 2085 (2002) (amending the definition of territorial waters for purposes of 
enforcement of maritime security provisions to include “all waters of the territorial sea of 
the United States as described in Presidential Proclamation 5928 of December 27, 
1988”).  
 48. Id. art. 12. 
 49. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 2(1).  
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the territorial sea, but such laws and regulations shall not apply to the 
design, construction, manning, or equipment of foreign ships unless they 
are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards 
and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner.50 The United States 
strictly interprets Articles 19 and 25 as inclusive of all activities that 
make passage non-innocent.51 The American delegate to the Third U.N. 
Conference on the Law of the Sea reiterated this long-standing position 
during the negotiations of the UNCLOS:52 
The United States understands, with respect to the right of innocent 
passage under UNCLOS, that— 
(A) all ships, including warships, regardless of, for example, 
cargo, armament, means of propulsion, flag, origin, destination, 
or purpose, enjoy the right of innocent passage;  
(B) article 19(2) contains an exhaustive list of activities that 
render passage non-innocent;  
(C) any determination of non-innocence of passage by a ship 
must be made on the basis of acts it commits while in the 
territorial sea, and not on the basis of, for example, cargo, 
armament, means of propulsion, flag, origin, destination, or 
purpose; and  
(D) the Convention does not authorize a coastal State to 
condition the exercise of the right of innocent passage by any 
ships, including warships, on the giving of prior notification to or 
the receipt of prior permission from the coastal State.53 
The list of activities in Article 19 that are inconsistent with the right 
of innocent passage are narrowly construed by the U.S. government, both 
in cases involving foreign-flagged vessels operating within the United 
States’ territorial sea and in cases of U.S. vessels transiting in other 
nations’ territorial seas. This understanding of Article 19 was 
strengthened by the complementary and mutual agreement of the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the “Jackson Hole 
                                            
 50. Id. art. 24(1).  
 51. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jam., 
Note by the Secretariat, 243-4, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/WS/37 (Dec. 10 1982), available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1982/ docs/vol_XVII/ 
a_conf-62_ws_37%20and%20add-1%20and%202.pdf. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
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Agreement.”54  Meeting at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in September 1989, 
the two superpowers agreed that Article 19 contains the “exhaustive list” 
of activities that may be considered non-innocent.55 Innocent passage 
may not be conditioned by notification or consent by the coastal state.56 
Paragraph 2 of the Jackson Hole Agreement states that, “[a]ll ships, 
including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of 
propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea 
in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification 
nor authorization is required.”57 
Coastal states, however, may take the necessary steps to prevent 
passage in its territorial sea that is “not innocent,”58 meaning that the 
transit is “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State.”59  Coastal states also may temporarily suspend innocent passage 
in localized areas if doing so is “essential for the protection of its 
security. . . .”60   
The Espionage Act of 1917,61 as amended by the Magnuson Act of 
1950,62 authorized the President to institute measures and promulgate 
rules and regulations necessary to govern the movement and anchorage 
of foreign-flag vessels in the territorial waters of the United States and to 
inspect such vessels at any time. The MTSA amended the definition of 
territorial waters for purposes of these provisions to include “all waters 
of the territorial sea of the United States.”63 This had the effect of 
extending the territorial sea for purposes of the jurisdiction of the 1917 
Espionage Act to 12 NM.64 The law authorized measures and regulations 
to safeguard against the destruction, loss, or injury of vessels, harbors, 
ports, and waterfront facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States due to sabotage or subversive acts, accidents, or other similar 
causes.65 These measures and regulations are authorized whenever the 
                                            
 54. Joint Statement With Attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International 
Law Governing Innocent Passage, U.S.-U.S.S.R., ¶¶ 2-3, Sept. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1444 
[hereinafter Jackson Hole Agreement]. 
 55. Id. ¶ 3. 
 56. Id. ¶ 2. 
 57. Id. 
 58. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 25(1).   
 59. Id. art. 19(1).   
 60. Id. art. 25(3).  
 61. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 220 (1917).    
 62. Magnuson Act of 1950, ch. 656, 64 Stat. 427-28 (1950).   
 63. Maritime Transportation Security Act § 104 (a)(2). 
 64. Presidential Proclamation No. 5928: Territorial Sea of the United States of 
America, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).  
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President determines that war or “disturbances of international relations” 
endangers the security of the United States.66  
In 1950, President Truman found that the security of the United 
States was endangered and directed that the provisions of the Espionage 
Act and the Magnuson Act be implemented. He also prescribed certain 
port security regulations to be enforced by the Coast Guard.67 The 
finding of endangerment to the security of the United States has 
remained in effect continuously since its issuance and has taken on new 
relevance in light of the focus on port and vessel security after the attacks 
of September 11, 2001.68  The Captain of the Port or District Commander 
may declare a security zone, which is an area of land, water, or land and 
water designated to safeguard either internal waters “or other waters of 
the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and 
obligations of the United States.”69  A security zone may be declared in 
order to protect vessels, ports, or harbors in the United States and 
territory and water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.70  The 
Captain of the Port has plenary police powers over persons and vessels in 
a security zone for the purpose of safeguarding U.S. maritime interests. 
Vessels may not “enter or remain in a security zone without the 
permission of the Captain of the Port,” and “shall obey any direction or 
order of the Captain of the Port.”71 The Captain of the Port also has 
authority to seize any vessel in the security zone and “remove any 
person, vessel, article, or thing from the security zone.”72 
Ordinarily, the coastal state may not exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over vessels conducting innocent passage.73 In certain cases, however, 
the coastal state has authority to assert criminal jurisdiction on board a 
foreign ship by conducting investigations, arresting persons, and 
temporarily detaining the vessel involved, but only in certain 
circumstances, such as if the “consequences of the crime extend to the 
coastal State.”74 The coastal state may also assert criminal jurisdiction in 
connection with a crime that is “of a kind to disturb the peace of the 
country or the good order of the territorial sea,” or if the assertion of 
                                            
 66. Id. 
 67. Exec. Order No. 10,173, 15 Fed. Reg. 7005 (Oct. 18, 1950). 
 68. Pres. Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 9387 (Feb. 26, 2002) (continuing emergency authority). 
 69. 33 C.F.R. § 165.30(a) (2009). 
 70. Id. § 165.30(b). 
 71. Id. § 165.33(a), (b). 
 72. Id. § 165.33(c), (d). 
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jurisdiction is needed to suppress narcotics trafficking.75 Coastal states 
also may leverage the full panoply of legal rationale for boarding 
available to all states throughout the high seas or EEZs, such as 
enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions within its territorial 
sea.  
For example, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 
determined that, “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.”76 A coastal state would be entitled 
under Resolution 1540 to board a foreign-flagged ship claiming to 
exercise innocent passage in its territorial sea because transporting 
weapons or materials in contravention of the Security Council mandate is 
both inconsistent with the right of innocent passage and is recognized as 
a threat to the peace and security of the coastal state. The coastal state 
would therefore be entitled to take all necessary measures in accordance 
with Resolution 1540, including the range of measures that constitute 
VBSS of the vessel and its cargo. The coastal state also is entitled to 
prescribe and enforce customs laws as well as fiscal, immigration and 
sanitary measures throughout the contiguous zone, which extends up to 
24 NM from the shoreline.77  “Sanitary” measures encompass preventive 
health and quarantine measures, but the term does not constitute a 
general provision for protection of the marine environment. 
1.  Coastal State EEZ Enforcement 
The exercise of civil fishing enforcement functions by the coastal 
state in the EEZ is quite robust, as demonstrated by the Monte Confurco 
case (Seychelles v. France), which was decided by the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2000.78  The ITLOS 
determined that a fishing vessel found with fish in its hold, transiting the 
EEZ of a coastal state without the consent of that country, may be 
presumed to have caught the fish in the coastal state’s EEZ in 
contravention of coastal state law.79  In that case, the fish were subject to 
seizure and the fishing vessel therefore had an interest—if not an 
obligation—to provide prior notification of passage to the coastal state in 
                                            
 75. Id. art. 27(1)(b), (d).  
 76. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).  
 77. UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 33(1)-(2).  
 78. Monte Confurco (Sey. v. Fr.), 125 I.L.R. 220 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000), 
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order to avoid having its cargo seized.80  The Monte Confurco was flying 
the flag of Seychelles, and had been properly licensed to fish in 
international waters.81  The Monteco Shipping Corporation, a company 
also registered in Seychelles, owned the ship.82  The Monte Confurco left 
Port Louis, Mauritius, on August 27, 2000, “to engage in long-line 
fishing in the Southern seas.”83 On November 8, 2000, a boarding party 
from the French surveillance frigate Floréal went on board the Monte 
Confurco in the EEZ of the Kerguelen Islands, which are located in the 
French Southern and Antarctic territory midway among Africa, 
Antarctica, and Australia.84  The Captain of the Floréal issued a procès-
verbal of violation (procès-verbal d’infraction) No. 1/00, against the 
Master of the Monte Confurco “for having [f]ailed to announce his 
presence and the quantity of fish carried aboard to the Head of the 
District of the Kerguelen Islands,” for having fished without prior 
authorization, and also for having tried to evade investigation by marine 
fisheries agents.85 
The next day the Captain drew up another procès-verbal, No. 2/00, 
apprehending the fish catch in the hold of the Monte Confurco, as well as 
seizing “navigation and communication equipment, computer equipment, 
and documents of the vessel and of the crew.”86  The French enforcement 
vessel observed a number of indicators that suggested the Monte 
Confurco had been fishing illegally in the EEZ.87  The Monte Confurco 
had 158 tons of Patagonian toothfish on board, valued at about $1.3 
million.88 The authorities discovered long-lines drifting in the water 
identical to, and whose numbers formed logical sequences with, the 
Monte Confurco’s lines.89  Additionally, the authorities observed 
defrosted bait that appeared to have been jettisoned into the sea, while 
noting the absence of other fishing vessels in the vicinity at that time.90 
Small frozen fish and fishhooks were also found onboard the fishing 
vessel toward the rear of the deck amidships and there was evidence that 
                                            
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. ¶ 27. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. ¶ 28. 
 84. Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. 220, ¶ 29. 
 85. Id. ¶ 30. 
 86. Id. ¶ 31. 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. 
 88. Id. ¶ 33. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Monte Confurco, 125 I.L.R. 220, ¶ 33. 
24 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
the on-board factory had recently been cleaned and the ship had 
quantities of fresh fish blood and waste.91 
The vessel was arrested and it was determined that the fish would be 
impounded and sold and the proceeds credited to the treasury “until court 
orders were obtained in respect of the proceeds.”92  The court of first 
instance at Saint-Paul noted in its November 22, 2000, order that the 
Monte Confurco entered the Kerguelen Islands’ EEZ “without prior 
authorization and without advising the head of a district of the nearest 
archipelago of its presence.”93  The Monte Confurco failed to declare the 
tonnage of fish carried on board, which also violated French 
regulations.94 The Monte Confurco’s unannounced presence in the 
Kerguelen Islands EEZ while in possession of a certain quantity of 
toothfish that it failed to declare “raised the ‘presumption’ that the whole 
catch was unlawfully fished” in the Kerguelen Islands’ EEZ.95  The ship 
claimed that it had failed to notify French authorities because the 
facsimile machine on the ship was not working properly,96 but France 
argued that notification could have been made by satellite telephone.97 
During legal proceedings, France called as an expert Professor 
Duhamel, an ichthyologist, to testify as to the fish stock in the area.98  
The expert believed that the toothfish in the hold could not have been 
caught at the location indicated in the ship’s log, as the water in that area 
was too deep.99  ITLOS found by a vote of nineteen to one that the 
allegations made by France were well founded.100 ITLOS also ruled that 
“France [should] promptly release the Monte Confurco and its Master 
upon the posting of a bond or other security,” the amount of which was 
set by ITLOS.101 In making the finding, ITLOS ruled that all of the 
toothfish probably could not have been caught at the location claimed by 
Seychelles, which lay outside of France’s EEZ.102 The coastal state is 
entitled to wide latitude in enforcing legitimate resource-related interests 
throughout the EEZ. But the EEZ is not a general security zone or 
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customs enforcement zone—it cannot be territorialized. For example, in 
the 1999 case M/V Saiga No. 2, ITLOS rejected the suggestion that 
coastal states could exercise customs authority in the EEZ.103 
D.  Right of Approach and Visit 
The right of approach and visit applies throughout the high seas,104 
and through Article 58 of UNCLOS, throughout the EEZ of all coastal 
states.105 That is, the rules governing approach and visit apply for all 
warships outside the territorial sea of foreign coastal states. Approach 
and visit is another long-standing norm of maritime practice that is 
codified in the high seas regime of UNCLOS.106  Warships of all nations 
may “approach” international merchant shipping transiting beyond the 
territorial sea, and inquire as to the nature of the vessel’s voyage, crew, 
cargo manifest, last port, next port or previous voyages, flag state 
registry, ownership, and other questions to elicit information about the 
ship and its purpose.107  Only “warships” may exercise the right, and the 
term includes sovereign immune ships of the coast guard or maritime law 
enforcement.108  Normally the exercise of the right of approach by a 
warship does not impose a requirement on the part of the queried vessel 
to respond to the queries, and a refusal to respond does not automatically 
trigger a right of visit on the part of the hailing ship.109  But in certain 
circumstances, the warship may exercise a right of “visit” or boarding of 
the foreign-flagged merchant ship, without flag state or master’s prior 
consent.110  
Article 110 of UNCLOS provides that as a general rule, warships of 
one nation are not entitled to board foreign-flagged vessels, unless 
authority to do so is derived from “powers conferred by treaty.”111  
Exceptions to this tenet of international law, however, are reflected in 
Article 110.112  Warships are justified in boarding a foreign-flagged 
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vessel in cases in which there is a “reasonable ground” for suspecting the 
ship in question is engaged in maritime piracy, slave-trafficking, or 
unauthorized broadcast at sea.113  All states may also board and inspect 
vessels that carry the same flag as the investigating warship, or that are 
“stateless,” meaning they are not legitimately registered to any state.114   
Suspect vessels evidence a lack of valid nationality through a 
number of cues, including failure to make a claim of nationality or show 
a flag of registration; making contradictory claims or multiple claims of 
nationality; revolving or changing flags of registration, vessel name, 
home port, or signboards during a single journey; or making evasive, 
misleading, or unverifiable responses to queries of nationality. In such 
cases, naval vessels of any state may assimilate the ship without 
nationality. Vessels without nationality that are assimilated may be 
boarded and searched under the terms and rules of engagement set forth 
by the state of the boarding warship.  The consent of the master is not 
required. Consequently, a warship may proceed to verify the flag registry 
of a suspected ship. This process is accomplished by dispatching a 
boarding team in a small boat under the command of an officer from the 
warship to board the suspect vessel.115   
If the review of ship documents confirms the suspicions, the 
boarding party may conduct a more thorough inspection and examination 
of the ship’s papers, and a physical search of the vessel and crew.  
Occasionally, illicit cargo is secreted inside the bulkhead or overhead of 
the vessel, or built into the frame of the ship, and a destructive search 
may be conducted inside the vessel at sea, or through forcefully 
penetrating the hull, in a port location.  If the suspicions prove to be 
unfounded, however, the owner of the vessel shall be compensated by 
the state of the warship for any loss or damage that may have been 
sustained.  
In recent years, nations have exercised the right of approach and visit 
most often in cases concerning maritime piracy.  Piracy is “any illegal 
act of violence, detention, or depredation committed beyond the 
territorial sea for private ends by crew or passengers of a private ship or 
aircraft against another ship, persons, or crew.”116  “Private” acts refer to 
acts not committed by public officials for a public or state purpose.   
Typically, piracy involves some pecuniary interest or private political 
motive, such as maritime terrorism.  For a violent act to meet the legal 
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definition of piracy, it must be committed outside of a state’s territorial 
waters.  Acts occurring inside territorial seas are classified as “armed 
robbery at sea,” and are the responsibility of the coastal state to suppress.  
Thus, “armed robbery at sea” in territorial waters can, a few meters 
away, become “piracy.” 
Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as consisting of the 
following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of the facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).117 
In sum, Articles 100-110 of UNCLOS reaffirm the duty and 
obligation of all states to act against piracy and maritime slave 
trafficking.  Both crimes, as well as the crime of illegal broadcast from 
the sea, constitute crimes of universal jurisdiction, and all states may 
assert jurisdiction over those offenses.  The authority is not academic. 
Warships from dozens of nations are involved in counter-piracy 
operations involving VBSS of foreign-flagged vessels in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. French, Dutch, Russian, and 
American forces have boarded ships in order to assert jurisdiction over 
Somali pirates operating in international waters. For example, on 
September 8, 2010, U.S. Marines conducted a boarding of the Magellan 
Star, a German-owned commercial ship, which had been seized by 
pirates off the coast of Somalia.118  The ship was retaken by elements of 
the Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit and USS Peleliu Amphibious 
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Ready Group, operating in the Gulf of Aden. Force Reconnaissance 
Marines conducted the VBSS, which resulted in the successful rescue of 
the vessel’s eleven crew members, and the capture of nine suspected 
pirates.  The regimes underpinning this norm enforcement are mostly a 
product of the U.N. system—beginning with rule sets adopted by the 
member states of the U.N. and embodied in the U.N. Charter and the 
treaties negotiated at the IMO, which is a specialized agency of the U.N.    
IV.  REGIMES IN THE U.N. CHARTER AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
MARITIME ORGANIZATION 
A regime differs from a norm in that it usually is conceived of as a 
complex of rules and norms. The U.N. Charter, the most comprehensive 
treaty in existence, captures norms, such as the right of self-defense, and 
places them within a regime.119  Likewise, the international law of the sea 
reflects a handful of important and long-standing norms, which 
previously were discussed.  The regimes embodied in UNCLOS also 
bring greater fidelity to the meaning of those norms in contemporary 
politics.  UNCLOS was constructed around an integrated set of mutually 
supporting regimes pertaining to geophysical areas on, over, or under the 
oceans.  A “regime” may be understood as a prevailing decision rule or rule 
system, or as a set of procedures that facilitate a convergence of 
expectations.120  But a regime is more than a set of rules; it presupposes a 
level of institutionalization that springs from an integrated framework, 
which has both qualities of formality and adherence or compliance.121  In 
UNCLOS, regimes provide the standards that establish international 
expectations or a sense of legal obligation.  In recent decades, regimes 
generally have become a more important factor in international relations 
and international law due to their increasing number and their growing 
influence on state behavior.122  The new regimes in UNCLOS provide the 
legal model of the oceans, and set down permissible activities by foreign 
states and distant water states on the surface of the seas, in the water 
column, on the seabed, and in the airspace above the water.  
                                            
 119. U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 51 (as well as associated chapters and articles of the 
Charter). 
 120. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1986). 
 121. Richard Little, International Regimes, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD 
POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 369, 373 (John Bayliss & 
Steve Smith eds., 3rd ed. 2005). 
 122. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD 
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 19 (1977). 
2010] Broken Taillight at Sea 29 
 
A.  Self-Defense 
The concept of an inherent right of self-defense, although it predates 
the founding of the U.N. and is recognized in customary international 
law,123 is reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter: “[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the U.N. until 
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”124  Thus, Article 51 recognizes the 
inherent right to both individual and collective self-defense.  The United 
States independently recognizes that nations may legally conduct VBSS 
as an instrument of self-defense, and the action may be justified either 
pursuant to customary international law or Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter.125  
Currently, U.S. naval forces exercise the inherent right of self-
defense in accordance with the Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. 
Forces (SROE).126  Informed by policy considerations as well as by 
international law, the SROE indicate that “unit commanders always 
retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in 
response to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.”127  A “hostile 
act” is an “attack or other use of force against the United States, U.S. 
forces, or other designated persons or property,” including “vital” U.S. 
government property.128  “Hostile intent” means the “threat of imminent 
use of force against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated 
persons or property.”129  The use of force is authorized for the duration of 
the demonstration of hostile intent against U.S. forces or designated 
persons or property.   
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There exists no precise metric for determining whether a threat of 
force is “imminent,” and a determination is made “based on an 
assessment of all facts and circumstances known to DOD forces at the 
time.”130  Furthermore, “[i]mminent does not necessarily mean 
immediate or instantaneous.”131 The use of force under SROE is 
predicated on two elements—necessity and proportionality.  “Necessity” 
for U.S. forces exists “when a hostile act occurs or when a force 
demonstrates hostile intent.”132  “Proportional” force used in self-defense 
is force that is “sufficient to respond decisively,” but not exceeding the 
“nature, duration, and scope” of what is required for defense.133  The 
United States and other nations apply the principle of self-defense 
throughout the spectrum of international politics—and the SROE 
provides a guide for implementing the right of self-defense for small 
units, such as a boarding team in a rigid hull inflatable boat, from a 
surface combatant warship or a national asset, such as a nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier or ballistic missile submarine.  Thus, the use of force in 
self-defense may occur at the tactical, operational, or strategic—even 
global—level.  For example, the imposition of the maritime quarantine 
against Cuba in 1962 was based on the right of self-defense.134  The case 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis quarantine illustrates that the exercise of self-
defense is not limited to cases involving an “actual armed attack.”  
Myres S. McDougal suggests that “imminence of attack of such high 
degree as to preclude effective resort . . . to non-violent modalities” has 
“always been regarded as sufficient justification.”135 
B.  Security Council Enforcement Action—Al-Qaeda,  
Iran, and North Korea 
The U.N. Security Council may authorize MIO/VBSS against the 
vessels of a particular state or organization under Article 41 of Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter.136 Security Council resolutions adopted under 
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Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are binding on all nations.137  Article 41 
provides Security Council authority for the “complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication. . . .”138  The provision may be 
used to authorize the naval forces of member states to intercept vessels 
and conduct VBSS as part of the mandate to take measures necessary to 
“maintain or restore international peace and security.”139 
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 217 of November 20, 
1965, for example, authorizing the United Kingdom to enforce an oil 
embargo against Rhodesia.140  The next year, the Security Council acted 
again, calling on the United Kingdom to “prevent, by the use of force if 
necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be 
carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia. . . .”141  Resolution 221 
authorized the use of force and characterized Rhodesia’s proclamation of 
independence as a “threat to the peace.”142  The so-called “Beira Patrol” 
enforced economic sanctions against the apartheid regime in Rhodesia—
cutting off the supply of oil from reaching the country.   
The burden for enforcing the Beira Patrol fell on Britain.  The 
Security Council action raised considerable challenges for crafting rules 
of engagement for VBSS, but the strong political authority of the U.N. 
action deterred states from supporting Rhodesia.143  There never was a 
risk that Rhodesia’s two supporters—South Africa and Portugal—would 
forcibly challenge the blockade.144  Since the end of the Cold War, the 
Security Council has acted on a handful of occasions to authorize states 
to conduct VBSS in order to intercept shipping.  In four separate cases, 
the Security Council authorized the interdiction of vessels entering or 
leaving Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Sierra 
Leone.  
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 661 imposed a general embargo on all trade with Iraq 
or Kuwait as a means of inducing Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 660, requiring the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces 
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from Kuwait.145  Operating under the Chapter VII authority, a large 
coalition of states used force against Iraq in response to Baghdad’s 
August 2, 1990, invasion of neighboring Kuwait.  Security Council 
Resolution 665 imposed a blockade on Iraq on August 25, 1990, in order 
to enforce Resolution 661.146  Resolution 665 also provided authority for 
states to “halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to 
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations,” using authority under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.147  During the conflict, coalition naval forces 
conducted VBSS against vessels bound in and out of Iraq, diverting 
numerous ships and seizing cargo that violated U.N. sanctions.  It is not 
clear whether these activities constituted a separate belligerent right of 
visit and search under the law of armed conflict, but my view is that they 
did not.  Instead, the member states of the U.N. formed the coalition in 
accordance with Security Council resolutions that authorized measures 
on land and at sea in order to enforce an embargo against Iraq.  
During the mid-1990s, the Security Council authorized additional 
MIO missions authorizing visit and search of ships to enforce sanctions 
against Yugoslavia (both the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [Serbia-Montenegro]).148   The 
Security Council also authorized visit and search of vessels inbound for 
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Haiti in 1992-93149 and Sierra Leone in 1997.150  In Security Council 
Resolution 1132 of October 8, 1997, the nations of the Economic 
Community of West African States were authorized to “prevent the sale 
or supply to Sierra Leone . . . using their flag vessels or aircraft, of 
petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related matériel of all 
types. . . .”151  In Resolution 1132, the Security Council did not use the 
term “VBSS,” but rather the synonymous terminology for nations to 
“halt” inward maritime shipping and “inspect and verify” their 
cargoes.152  More recently, in the era after the attacks of September 11, 
2001, the Security Council acted to address the threat of terrorism and 
the transportation of WMDs at sea. Resolutions concerning Al-Qaeda, 
Iran, and North Korea provide the naval forces of U.N. member states 
with authority to conduct VBSS in specific circumstances. 
1.  Al-Qaeda 
It was clear after September 11, 2001, that in order to have relevancy 
in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the threat against WMDs, the Security 
Council would have to develop additional authorities aimed at securing 
the world from accelerating proliferation of WMDs.  The 2003 public 
exposure of the nuclear proliferation network, run out of Pakistan by Dr. 
Abdul Qadeer Khan, provided further impetus for controlling WMDs.153  
Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in 2004 the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1540, which determined that the 
“proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as 
their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.”154  Within the context of the resolution, “means of delivery” 
includes “missiles, rockets, and other unmanned systems capable of 
delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons . . . designed for 
such use.”  The Resolution also targets “related materials,” which it 
defines as “materials, equipment, and technology covered by relevant 
multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control 
lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use 
                                            
 149. S.C. Res. 875, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0875 (Oct. 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, ¶ 10, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/0917 (May 6, 1994).   
 150. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997).  
 151. Id. ¶ 6.  
 152. Id. ¶ 8. 
 153. See, e.g., William Langewiesche, The Wrath of Khan: How A. Q. Khan Made 
Pakistan a Nuclear Power—and Showed That the Spread of Atomic Weapons Can’t Be 
Stopped, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 62-85 (Nov. 2005). 
 154. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).  
34 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of 
delivery.”155 
Four years later, Resolution 1810 was the next comprehensive non-
proliferation resolution adopted by the Security Council.156  The 
Resolution reaffirmed Resolution 1540, and reviewed progress toward 
implementation of measures to prevent the proliferation WMDs and their 
means of delivery.  The Resolution extended the mandate of the 
Resolution 1540 Committee for a period of three more years—until April 
25, 2011.157  Resolution 1540 provided sweeping legal authority for 
interdiction of WMDs and their delivery systems.  In contrast, Resolution 
1810 gauged the progress to date and sought to develop a baseline of 
implementation by states by developing a program for provision of 
technical expertise, “outreach, dialogue, assistance, and cooperation,” to 
enhance coordination and implementation.  In addition to the overarching 
mandate contained in Resolutions 1540 and 1810, the Security Council 
has struggled to adopt targeted authorities for interdicting ships at sea 
that are engaged in supporting Iranian and North Korean WMD 
programs.  
2.  Iran  
The President of the U.N. Security Council issued a statement on 
March 29, 2006, in which he noted concern over Iran’s decision to 
resume uranium enrichment and its associated nuclear program research 
and development, as well as Tehran’s suspension of cooperation with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Additional Protocol.158  The Security Council 
then called on Iran to follow through with the transparency measures 
required by IAEA Board of Governors Resolution GOV/2006/14 
concerning Iran’s implementation of the NPT.159  In that Resolution, the 
Board of Governors deemed it necessary for Iran to take a variety of 
measures to resolve “outstanding questions” and build confidence.160  
These measures included a suspension of uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing activities, including research and development, in a manner 
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that could be verified by the IAEA.161  The Board of Governors also 
called upon Iran to ensure ratification and implementation of the full 
NPT Additional Protocol, and comply with the instrument pending 
ratification, which Tehran had signed on December 18, 2003.162  Finally, 
the IAEA sought Iranian implementation of additional transparency 
measures, providing access to individuals, documentation, and 
laboratories inside the country.163  The transparency provisions extended 
beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and the 
Additional Protocol, but were requested personally by the IAEA Director 
General.164 
Four months after the adoption of Board of Governors Resolution 
GOV/2006/14, with Iran still intransigent, the U.N. Security Council 
stepped in.  In July 2006, the Council adopted Resolution 1696, which 
reiterated the call for Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board 
of Governors in Resolution GOV/2006/14.165  The operative statutory 
effect of Resolution 1696 was to make Iranian compliance with the 
previous statement of the President of the Security Council legally 
binding on Iran.  Tehran still had not resolved “outstanding questions” 
concerning its nuclear activities, and the Resolution demanded that Iran 
suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and 
stop further nuclear research and development.166  The IAEA was 
authorized to verify the cessation of the prohibited activities.167  Tehran 
dragged its feet.  On December 23, 2006, the Security Council imposed 
sanctions on Iran through Resolution 1737.168  Resolution 1737 further 
required all states to take measures to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer 
of items that could contribute to Iran’s civil or military nuclear 
enrichment program.169  
Shortly thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1747, 
which also was decided under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter. 170  Resolution 1747 demanded that Iran comply with the Board 
of Governors Resolution GOV/2006/14, and mandated Tehran’s action 
as “essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose” of 
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its nuclear program.171  The Resolution also imposed a duty on all states 
to use “vigilance and restraint” towards the movement of individuals 
supporting Iran’s nuclear proliferation.172  It further decided that Iran is 
not permitted to “supply, sell, or transfer” a range of prohibited 
weapons.173   
In 2008, the Security Council imposed additional restraints through 
the adoption of Resolution 1803, which focused targeted trade 
restrictions against Tehran for refusing to suspend its uranium-
enrichment and heavy-water projects.174  Fourteen nations voted in favor 
of Resolution 1803, and although no country voted against the 
Resolution, Indonesia abstained.175  Jakarta, mindful of its geopolitical 
reality as an archipelagic nation, is always wary of U.N. Security Council 
authority extending throughout the oceans.   
The Resolution bans shipment to Iran of major weapons systems, 
such as armored battle tanks and warships, as well as the transfer of 
ballistic missile technology into the country.176  The Resolution also 
includes annexes identifying suspected Iranian individuals and 
companies that should be shunned by the international community.177  
Nations were required to ensure their financial institutions and banks, 
including overseas branches, were not involved inadvertently in 
providing capital investment in nuclear-related activities.178  Finally, the 
Resolution authorized states to inspect cargo of aircraft and vessels to 
and from Iran suspected of trafficking in proscribed materials and 
weapons, conditional upon flag state consent.179  However, because states 
already may board ships based upon flag state consent, the effect of the 
provision is symbolic and political, rather than legally substantive.  
3.  North Korea 
With the North Korean (DPRK) surprise attack on the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) Navy Cheonan offshore patrol vessel on March 27, 2010, 
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Security Council sanctions against DPRK have acquired new urgency.  
For nearly two decades, the DPRK has publicly announced its intentions 
to develop WMDs, including production of nuclear weapons.  As a 
member of the NPT, North Korea had signed a full-scope safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA, as required by the treaty.180  But in a March 
12, 1993 letter to the president of the Security Council, the DPRK 
expressed an intention to withdraw from the NPT.  On March 25, the 
IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on North Korea to 
honor its existing obligations.181  Unable to verify whether DPRK nuclear 
material had been diverted from peaceful use, the IAEA Board of 
Governors found the reclusive nation in violation of its IAEA safeguards 
agreement on April 1, 1993.182  The Security Council responded by 
calling on Pyongyang to reconsider its announcement and honor its 
commitment to non-proliferation pursuant to the treaty.183     
North Korea engaged in ballistic missile tests on July 5, 2006.  In 
condemning the missile launches, the Security Council called on all 
nations to prevent missiles and missile-related materials and technology 
from supporting the DPRK’s missile and WMD programs.184  Resolution 
1718 of October 14, 2006 called on all states to prevent the DPRK from 
exporting any armaments included in a long list of conventional weapons 
and WMDs, as well as luxury commercial goods.185  The latter 
proscription was designed to impinge on the exuberant lifestyle of the 
regime’s elite, bringing pressure to bear on the decision makers.  The 
Security Council mandate provides that nations should disrupt North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and transfer of weapons of 
mass destruction, as well as trafficking in armored battle tanks, armored 
combat vehicles, large caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters, warships, missiles, and associated systems.186 
On April 13, 2009, the President of the Security Council issued a 
statement condemning a successful April 5 missile launch by North 
Korea.187  Six weeks later, on May 25, Pyongyang conducted its second 
successful nuclear test. Soon afterward, on June 12, 2009, the U.N. 
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Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 under Article 41 of Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter.188  Resolution 1874 dictated that the DPRK 
must strictly comply with its obligations under the previous resolutions, 
Resolution 1718 in particular, and abandon all nuclear activities 
inconsistent with either the NPT or the Safeguards Agreement.189 
Concerning interdiction, Resolution 1874 called upon all states to 
inspect, all cargo to and from the DPRK that transits their territorial ports 
or seas if a nation has reasonable grounds to believe cargo contains items 
that promote the transfer or export of North Korea’s conventional or 
WMD programs.190  If the flag state does not consent to an inspection of 
cargo on the high seas, the Security Council directed that the ship should 
proceed to a port for inspection at the pier.191 The transfer of armaments 
from the DPRK is banned, and all imports of weapons into the DPRK are 
to be halted, excepting certain small arms and light weapons.192 The new 
regime institutes an enhanced maritime cargo inspection program, but 
flag state consent is still required to conduct a VBSS.193  Once again, the 
Security Council adopted peacetime enforcement measures.  Because the 
action is not predicated on a belligerent wartime right, the Resolution is 
not an exercise of the belligerent right of visit and search.  Instead, the 
provisions constitute collective measures for the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security in accordance with Article 
42 of the U.N. Charter.194   
Resolutions 1718 and 1874 provide an overall framework that links 
pre-existing international legal authorities together, binding the 
foundational Resolution 1540 with the NPT, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, to compel North 
Korea and Iran to abandon their pursuit of advanced weapons.195  In 
addition to creating legal guidance, the resolutions and associated 
instruments provide political cover for nations to enhance domestic 
counter-proliferation authorities.  This umbrella of political support is 
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essential for nations that are more reticent about the use of force in world 
politics.  Tokyo, for example, relied on Resolution 1874 to develop ship 
boarding authority for the Japan Coast Guard to be able to interdict North 
Korean ships.  On May 28, 2010, a coalition of lawmakers in the House 
of Councilors of the Diet of Japan enacted a new law authorizing the 
Japan Coast Guard to inspect ships suspected of carrying banned cargo 
bound for or leaving North Korea.196  Previous efforts to pass such a law 
had failed because they lacked bipartisan support. The new law, 
however, was adopted in the wake of the Security Council Resolution 
1874. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Tale of Two Security Council Counter-Proliferation Regimes197 
UNSCR 1874 (2009) 
[North Korea] 
UNSCR 1929 (2010) 
[Iran] 
• Bans all arms transfers from 
DPRK and all arms to DPRK 
(except small arms & light 
weapons) 
• Enhanced maritime cargo 
“inspection” regime (but still 
requires flag state consent) 
• No bunkering services 
• Asks states not to provide 
grants, loans, or public 
financial help IF it could 
contribute to DPRK 
proliferation efforts 
• Travel limitations 
• Bans major weapons systems 
(i.e., tanks, warships, etc.) 
transfers and ballistic missile 
technology to Iran 
• High seas boarding based on 
flag state consent 
• No bunkering services 
• Prohibits Iranian foreign  
investment in nuclear-related 
activities and provision of 
financial services that support 
Iran’s nuclear program 
• Travel limitations 
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4.  Regimes of the International Maritime Organization 
The IMO is the U.N.’s specialized agency for maritime matters.  
With 167 member states, the organization has produced approximately 
fifty treaties and hundreds of codes and guidelines to enhance safety and 
security at sea.  The work conducted at the IMO affects flag, port, and 
coastal states worldwide, and the regimes developed through the IMO’s 
unique “spirit of cooperation,” which generally requires broad consensus 
on issuance of new mandates, has done more to strengthen maritime 
security than any organization besides the Security Council.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States 
prompted a concerted response from the IMO, reflected in Assembly 
Resolution A.924(22).198  In response to Resolution A.924(22), the Legal 
Committee of the IMO began a comprehensive review of existing 
maritime security treaties, and in particular the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)199 and the 1988 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation.200  These two treaties formed the bedrock of 
maritime security authority in international law.  Additionally, the 
asymmetric nature of the threat of Al-Qaeda inspired the member states 
of the IMO to conduct a comprehensive review to see if the instruments 
required updating. Both treaties were radically amended to meet the new 
threats to maritime security.  
First, SOLAS was strengthened in December 2002, when the 
member states of the IMO adopted a new amendment regime to protect 
ships and port facilities from terrorist attack.201 The revised SOLAS 
incorporates a new chapter XI, which includes the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).202 The ISPS Code contains a 
comprehensive framework for governments, the shipping industry and 
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port authorities to coordinate and manage, evaluate and improve 
maritime security practices.203 The ISPS Code includes a mandatory 
section (Part A),204 as well as a series of guidelines on measures to take 
to implement the requirements in a second, non-mandatory section 
(Part B).205 National maritime administrators should establish maritime 
security levels and oversee implementation of the ISPS Code for vessels 
flying their flag.  
Ships entering the port of a state party should comply with the 
security level established by the port authorities, if that level is higher 
than the security level set by the flag state’s maritime administration. The 
new regulations require all ships to develop a security plan approved by 
the flag state and be outfitted with a security alert system.206 Once 
activated, the security alert system transmits the alarm to designated 
maritime authorities, identifying the ship and its location.207 The system 
does not raise any alarm on board the ship, and it may be used to alert 
shore side security of an unfolding threat, such as a ship under attack by 
terrorists or pirates. The security alert system must be capable of being 
activated from the navigation bridge and at least one other location on 
board the ship so that it can be triggered surreptitiously.208 Although the 
SOLAS amendments are critically important in developing a 
comprehensive package of ship and port facility security measures for 
the global maritime transportation system, the provisions do not directly 
facilitate ship boarding. The 2005 Protocols to the 1988 Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA), however, establish the most comprehensive boarding 
regime to date.209  The 1988 Convention is called the Achille Lauro 
Treaty, because it was adopted in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the 
Italian cruise ship.210   
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C.  Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 
In 2002, the member states of the IMO began work on a 
comprehensive update of the original SUA or Achille Lauro Treaty of 
1988. The remarkable story behind this effort dates back to 1985 when 
the Italian-flagged cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked by Palestinian 
terrorists, an episode that ended in the brutal murder of disabled 
American Jewish passenger, Leon Klinghoffer.211 Many states did not 
have criminal legislation for extradition or prosecution for the crime of 
vessel hijacking. To fill this gap in the law, the year following the attack, 
Austria, Egypt, and Italy proposed that the IMO prepare a convention to 
facilitate law enforcement cooperation against ship hijackers.212 The 
treaty provides a comprehensive set of rules to ensure close coordination 
among states to extradite and prosecute individuals who committed a 
number of capital crimes at sea, including seizure of a ship by force, acts 
of violence on board ships, and placement of bombs on board a ship.213  
Article 3 of the 1988 SUA created the offense of unlawfully and 
intentionally seizing “control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any 
other form of intimidation,” while Article 8 provides a mechanism for 
flag states and vessel masters to deliver to the authorities of any state 
party an individual suspected of committing an offense covered by the 
Convention.  The final treaty text became the 1988 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA), which was adopted by the IMO at a conference in 
Rome in March, 1988, and entered into force on March 1, 1992.214  
Today the SUA has 156 state parties.215 SUA commits member states to 
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criminalize the unlawful and intentional seizure or exercise of control 
over a ship by force or threat.216 The treaty further provides that state 
parties shall either prosecute a violation or extradite the suspect.217  
The amendments to the 1988 SUA Convention unfolded between 
2002 and 2005, resulting in development of two protocols—one that 
applies to ships and the other that applies to fixed platforms on the 
continental shelf. The 2005 Protocols concerning vessels adds a new 
Article, 3bis, which commits states to criminalize the maritime 
transportation of WMDs, and their components and means of delivery.218  
The 2005 Protocol makes it an offense for a person to “unlawfully and 
intentionally” commit acts that “intimidate a population” or “compel a 
Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing 
any act,” including: using explosives, or biological, nuclear or chemical 
(BCN) weapons on or against a ship; using a ship in a manner that causes 
death or serious injury or damage, and transporting on the ship explosive, 
radioactive, or fissionable material or a BCN weapon that is intended to 
be used for terrorism, including so-called “dual use” items that may have 
a legitimate purpose, but nonetheless contribute “to the design, 
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon . . . .”219  Article 3ter creates 
an offense for unlawfully and intentionally transporting on board a ship 
someone known to be a terrorist.220  Article 3quarter creates an offense 
for unlawfully and intentionally injuring or killing any person in 
connection with one of the other offenses.221  The new article also 
introduces inchoate crimes in this regard, including attempt, accomplice, 
organizing and directing offenses, or contributing to the commission of 
such crimes.222   
A new Article 8bis creates a comprehensive framework for ship 
boarding that may be utilized by one nation that seeks to board the ship 
of another flag state.  The ship boarding procedures in the 2005 Protocol 
are comprehensive and detailed, calling on state parties to cooperate “to 
the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress unlawful acts” covered 
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in the Convention.223 The procedures are triggered by one state having a 
“reasonable grounds to suspect” that a ship or person on board the ship is 
involved in one of the offenses identified in Article 3.224  First, a party 
seeking to board the ship of another party should confirm the nationality 
of the vessel.  If the nationality is verified, then the state seeking to board 
a foreign-flagged ship should request authorization from the flag state, 
including asking for permission to execute specific measures, such as 
stopping, boarding, or searching the ship or its cargo or persons on 
board.  The flag state has the option of authorizing the boarding, 
conducting the boarding itself or in conjunction with the state making the 
request, or declining the request for boarding.225 
 
Original contracting states for the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA 2005):226 
Country Date of signature or  
deposit of instrument 
Cook Islands (accession) 12 March 2007
Dominican Republic (accession) 9 March 2010
Estonia (ratification) 16 May 2008
Fiji (accession) 21 May 2008
Latvia (accession) 16 November 2009
Liechtenstein (accession) 28 August 2009
Marshall Islands (accession) 9 May 2008
Nauru (accession) 29 April 2010
Saint Kitts and Nevis (accession) 29 March 2007
Spain (ratification) 16 April 2008
Switzerland (accession) 15 October 2008
Vanuatu (accession) 20 August 2008
 
The 2005 Protocols are significant in several ways.  First, the treaty 
expands the definitions of acts that constitute terrorism and transfers 
them to the maritime context.  Second, it includes perhaps the most 
comprehensive international framework for countering the proliferation 
of WMDs.  Third, the boarding provisions provide an enforcement 
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mechanism within a multilateral terrorism and counter-proliferation 
treaty. The boarding provisions also contain safeguards to protect human 
rights, and persons embarked on vessels that are boarded are to be treated 
in accordance with international human rights law.227  Finally, states may 
provide pre-approval of boarding of their ships by foreign-flagged 
warships under some circumstances. Any flag state may submit a 
declaration to the Secretary-General of the IMO authorizing boarding 
and search of its vessels by another state when the other state has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the ship or a person on board is 
suspected of a covered offense. Flag states also may file a similar 
declaration authorizing boarding of vessels of the flag state in cases 
where the flag state does not respond within four hours to a request to 
verify the registration of the vessel.228  
V.  CONCLUSION 
With PSI, Resolution 1540, and the 2005 SUA Protocols, nations are 
establishing a global, and increasingly effective, network of legal and 
policy authorities to synchronize intelligence and operations against 
terrorists and WMDs in the maritime domain. After five years, the 2005 
SUA Protocols finally have entered into force. Although application of 
the Protocols has gotten off to a disappointingly slow start, a large 
number of additional ratifications would allow the SUA regime to gain 
momentum and would help states to codify the deep and rich 
collaboration already evident in the PSI into a formal international 
framework. While the flexibility of PSI has been a hallmark of its 
success, the lack of formal structure has made some nations—Malaysia 
and Indonesia, for example—reluctant to fully participate.  For all of the 
groundbreaking and frankly astonishing success of PSI, some countries 
are wary of its informal nature and process. Although there is value in 
creating an interlocking network of formal and informal arrangements, 
the SUA protocols may end up eclipsing PSI. The era of the “coalition of 
the willing” may be coming to a close; the concept having been badly 
bruised by the U.S. experience in Iraq.  Consequently, more formal 
multilateral arrangements, such as the SUA Treaty, now may generate 
greater international support than informal and less transparent 
initiatives.  
If the 2005 amendments are to have a significant effect on 
international cooperation, states must not only accede to them, but utilize 
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them. The original 1988 SUA Convention, although widely accepted, has 
not played the role that it might have because states have neglected to 
implement legislation or make political commitments to ensure that it 
works. The shipping industry is especially hopeful that the 2005 
amendments will attract widespread support. Shipping commerce is a 
global industry, relying on a common framework of norms and regimes. 
The industry can only operate efficiently when regulations applicable to 
a particular ship are identical in the port of departure, on the high seas, 
and in the port of arrival. Because PSI focuses on enlarging national 
authorities rather than global rules, it is more likely to inadvertently 
create a web of inconsistent national laws than would occur under the 
international legal regime of SUA.  
 
 
